Reference
Hillman, J. (1992) Re-Visioning Psychology. Harper Perennial edition published 1992.

p. xv “This book is about soul-making.”
“ Our life is psychological, and the purpose of life is to make psyche of it, to find connections between life and soul.” Hillman relates or equates psyche with soul quite often in the context of this book. xRef the Etymology of Psyche:

psyche (n.)
1640s, “animating spirit,” from Latin psyche, from Greek psykhe “the soul, mind, spirit; breath; life, one's life, the invisible animating principle or entity which occupies and directs the physical body; understanding” (personified as Psykhe, the beloved of Eros), akin to psykhein “to blow, cool,” from PIE root *bhes- “to blow, to breathe” (source also of Sanskrit bhas-), “Probably imitative” [Watkins].
Also in ancient Greek, “departed soul, spirit, ghost,” and often represented symbolically as a butterfly or moth. The word had extensive sense development in Platonic philosophy and Jewish-influenced theological writing of St. Paul (compare spirit (n.)). Meaning “human soul” is from 1650s. In English, psychological sense “mind,” is attested by 1910.

“The job of psychology is to offer a way and find a place for soul within its own field.”

Ω p. xvi “By soul I mean, first of all, a perspective rather than a substance, a viewpoint toward things rather than a thing itself. This perspective is reflective; it mediates events and makes differences between ourselves and everything that happens. Between us and events, between the doer and the deed, there is a reflective moment - and soul-making means differentiating this middle ground.” What exactly does he mean by differentiating? …is it simply to demarcate this middle ground between subject and object, between the doer and the deed? …so this book is a work to define this territory that belongs to soul-making?
“In another attempt upon the idea of soul I suggested that the word refers to that unknown component which makes meaning possible, turns events into experiences, is communicated in love, and has a religious concern. These four qualifications I had already put forth some years ago;⁴ I had begun to use the term freely, usually interchangeably with psyche (from Greek) and anima (from Latin). Now I am adding three necessary modifications.
First, “soul” refers to the deepening of events into experiences;
second, the significance soul makes possible, whether in love or in religious concern, derives from its special relation to death.
And third, by “soul” I mean the imaginative possibility in our natures, the experiencing through reflective speculation, dream, image, and fantasy - that mode which recognizes all realities as primarily symbolic or metaphorical.” Underline mine. So basically, Soul is the ability for symbolic thinking.

p. xvii “Everything we know and feel and every statement we make are all fantasy-based, that is, they derive from psychic images. … Fantasy-images are both the raw materials and finished products of psyche, and they are the privileged mode of access to knowledge of soul. Nothing is more primary.” So without soul as the symbolic thinking principle there is no communication with psyche, with the Self, with the unconscious.

p3 “From the outset we are assuming that the close connection between the personified world of animism and anima - soul - is more than verbal, and that personifying is a way of soul-making. That is, we are assuming that soul-making depends upon the ability to personify, which in turn depends upon anima. …
What is needed is a revisioning, a fundamental shift of perspective out of that soulless predicament we call modern consciousness.”

p23 “Image is psyche,” says Jung.^55a “The psyche consists essentially of images … a 'picturing' of vital activities.”^55b

p46 “An axiom of depth psychology asserts that what is not admitted into awareness irrupts in ungainly, obsessive, literalistic ways, affecting consciousness with precisely the qualities it strives to exclude. Personifying not allowed as a metaphorical vision returns in concrete form; we seize upon people, we cling to other persons. They become invested with repressed images so that they grow in importance, … while the psyche finds itself more fascinated, more glued and stuck to these concrete individuals than it would have been to the metaphorical persons that are at the root of the projection onto people. Without metaphorical persons, we are forced in desperate clutching literalisms.
… The literalisms into which we constrict our drives hold us faster than do the drives themselves.
p47 … Others carry our souls and become our soul figures, to the final consequence that without these idols we fall into the despair of loneliness and turn to suicide.”

p49 “This “me,” even most deeply experienced as if from the ground of being, seemingly so unique, so truly my own, is utterly collective. For psyche is not mine, and the statements that express my deepest person such as: “I love you,” “I am afraid,' “I promise,” are collective universals whose value lies just in their impersonality, that they are said by everyone, everywhere. As collective universals, these statemens are archetypally personal, but not literally so.
To speak of my anima and my soul expresses the personalistic fallacy. Although these archetypal experiences of the personal give alt and substance to my personal individuality, making me feel that there is indeed a soul, this “me-ness” is not mine. … The more profoundly archetypal my experiences of soul, the more I recognize how they are beyond me, presented to me, a present, a gift, even while they feel my most personal possession. … For such experiences derive from the archetype of the personal, making us feel both archetypal and personal at the same instant.”